INTRODUCTION
High-quality foods markets have changed dramatically along the past twenty years and moreover with the advent of the new millennium. A plethora of food-safety breakdowns diminished consumers' confidence and trust in the ability of the agro-food industry and governmental authorities to assure the provision of safe and high quality foods. Increasing vertical coordination in food supply chains has triggered a shift in structures from single firm to multi-stakeholder supply-chain configurations (Barkema and Drabenstott, 1995) . A particularly critical issue of this new paradigm of food supply is the emergence of opportunistic behaviour associated with information asymmetries between contracting parties.
Credible quality signalling is a pivotal element facilitating transactions among agents in the food chain. Reliable product information becomes even more important when firms' differentiation strategies involve credence attributes such as food safety, organic farming or fair trade. Shifts in governmental consumer protection strategies, stricter private food quality and safety standards place greater responsibility on food suppliers, especially retailers, who are becoming "gatekeeper's" and guarantors of food quality and safety. This is certainly the case in the UK where the Food Safety Act of 1990 requires a stricter control of production and processing Private Third-party Certification in Food Supply 3 of 25 along the supply chain and forces retailers to assume their share of responsibility on the provision of food safety (Henson and Northen, 1998) .
Across Europe, retailers are adapting to a new market and regulatory environment, developing and imposing quality assurance systems on their suppliers [Fulponi, 2006; Henson, 2006] . The main motivation for these strategies is the assurance of food safety and quality and liability mitigation . These control systems reassure governmental authorities and consumers' on the quality and safety of products. In recent years several new control and certification bodies have emerged. Thus, new markets have evolved where third-party certifiers (TPC) compete to provide food quality and safety certification services for different private or public food standards, from good farming practices to processor specifications in various standards. This paper focuses on the third-party certification market. Increasing demand for independent private third-party certification of quality assurance schemes creates incentives for market entry of new firms, thus affecting the level of competition among accredited certifiers. Our goal is to investigate the impact of structural change in the TPC market by addressing the issue of market competition as it can affect the accuracy of certification procedures and thus the credibility of private food standards altogether.
Third-party certifiers (TPC) have evolved as independent and credible institutions designed to ensure quality and safety standards across food Private Third-party Certification in Food Supply 4 of 25 markets. Third-party certification is one way to assess and to monitor firm's compliance with standards, practices, principles, and/or legal requirements.
Certification can be defined as a voluntary assessment of and approval by an accredited party and an accredited standard (Meuwissen et al., 2003) .
Product and/or process certification may reduce uncertainties and lower overall transaction costs that arise from information asymmetries between producers and retailers in vertical supply chains [Caswell et al., 1998; Tanner, 2000; Deaton, 2004; Manning and Baines, 2004] . Busch et al. (2005) and Tanner (2000) point out that the credibility of third-party certification critically depends on the objectiveness and independence of the certifier. As market entry alters the competitive structure in the TPC market, there may be a linkage between the accuracy of TPCs and market structure as competition stiffens (Lizzeri, 1999) . If this is the case, the role of TPCs as an efficient signalling institution may be challenged [Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone, 2003; McCluskey, 2000] .
The paper is organized as follows: Section two provides an overview of the economics of third-party certification with an emphasis on recent work and its implications on food markets. Section three proposes an analytical framework relating the structure of the TPC market to the objectivity of the certification process. The fourth section presents an empirical case study using panel data on the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group Good Private Third-party Certification in Food Supply 5 of 25 Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP) quality assurance system in the international fruits and vegetables market. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
THE EMERGENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFIERS AND THEIR

ROLE IN FOOD CHAINS
According to neo-classical economic model, both suppliers and buyers in the market are fully informed about the homogenous commodity that is exchanged. The reality of today's global food markets, however, is characterised by highly diversified products and far reaching information deficits on both side of the market [Jahn, Schramm and Spiller, 2005; Busch and Bain, 2004] . Empirical studies on food markets suggest that third-party certifiers may mitigate market failure due to information asymmetries between market participants. For instance, Caswell et al. (1998) argue that third-party certification may reduce transactions costs where uncertainty about product quality attributes exists. Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone (2003) investigate the relation between the stringency of TPCs and optimal quality systems in terms of agricultural output. They find that credible signals in the market place critically depend on the ability of TPCs to establish a positive reputation for its certification service.
While public authorities enforce quality and safety standards through laws and regulations, private agents managing quality assurance schemes punish non-compliance by refusing to issue conformity signals. However, certifiers typically follow some form of economic profit-maximisation rule Private Third-party Certification in Food Supply 6 of 25 and the payment of their services is somewhat dependent on quantities of product certified that conforms to the standard. This is an important difference and should not be ignored (Jahn, Schramm and Spiller, 2005) .
The analysis of private TPCs has to acknowledge the existence of opportunistic behaviour which may hinder the efficiency and effectiveness of TPC in providing quality signals. Tirole (1986) offers important insight into the importance of independence of the third party in transaction processes. His seminal paper uses principal agent theory to model the behaviour of three parties (principal, agent and supervisor) in an organization viewed as a network of intertwined contracts. He shows that, with a dependent third party, coalitions may emerge that prevents a free and efficient flow of information between market partners. Thus, the market structure needs to be considered when analysing TPC markets. Using game theory, Lizzeri (1999) studies the impact of market structure on the process of gathering and revealing information. He shows that if the TPC is a monopolist, it will reveal only part of the available information creating a monopoly rent and decreasing social welfare. Contrarily, under a perfectly competitive TPC market, all private information is revealed and social welfare is optimal. As many food sectors are shifting from price-to quality-based competition, TPCs are becoming increasingly important and powerful players in discriminating between higher and lower quality food producers (Henson and Reardon, 2005) . Eventually, this trend will likely create larger and more powerful TPCs whose self-interest in profit-maximization, could in turn, affect the functioning of the certification market itself. This justifies a closer scrutiny of both the structure of the TPC markets and its role as a credible quality assurance institution. A critical question is whether the increasing competitive pressure in the certification market will affect the outcome and hence the reliability of the certification process?
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical economic literature investigates the role of market intermediaries, auditors and certifiers in different contexts and markets. This Previous work has analysed the role of intermediaries as agents disclosing otherwise private information and at the impact of market structure on its effectiveness. Our framework illustrates the structure of private, business-to-business certification, such as the EurepGAP food standard or those emerging from the ISO 9000 standard family. Assuming a private standard system Figure 1 illustrates the institutional structure of a third-party certification system where the standard owner establishes an accreditation system to guarantee and streamline the flow of quality information through certification from producers upstream to the retail market downstream.
Assuming a retail-owned standard, standard requirements are likely to be imposed on all suppliers. Thus, a producer or processor, aiming to enter a contractual relationship, must clearly demonstrate standard compliance which usually requires supplier certification by a third party. A certificate is issued by the TPC based on established rules laid down and reviewed by the standard owner. TPCs in turn have to prove their eligibility to conduct inspections through ISO 65/EN 45011 standard accreditation. Eventually, it is the standard owner's responsibility to oversee the development, monitoring and ultimate control of applicable procedures. Changes in the competitive structure of the certification market may then have significant implications for both certifiers and associated suppliers.
Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone (2003) argue that a credible certification scheme is one where high quality products have higher chances of being certified than low quality products. Accurate and independent third-party certification should not only be able to minimize both type I and II certification errors, but also resist any pressure to relax its procedures.
Assuming that accuracy levels increase with firm size and reputation, multinational certifiers may have a competitive advantage in terms of cost and reputation over small and local TPCs. Reputation itself is a function of a TPC's market experience. Tightening competition may either increase the level of accuracy or reduce it and so affect the amount and reliability of information becoming available (Lizzeri, 1999 
Data Set
The data used in this analysis is partly obtained directly from 
Comp_Cert is the dependant variable and denotes the number of accredited EurepGAP TPCs j that compete for certification contracts in the fruit and vegetable sector in country i. The errors ε it are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. Time_of_Entry represents the month and year of entry of a TPC into the EurepGAP system. As an increasing number of TPCs around the world apply for EurepGAP accreditation, we hypothesize that a later market entry entails higher competitive pressure as the number of incumbent certifiers increases. Activity is a proxy of a TPC's economies of scale denoting the number of countries in which the company certifies fruits and vegetables for EurepGAP. As can be seen from Table 1 the average TPC certifies produce in around 13 countries. However, the standard deviation indicates a large bandwidth. From the dataset, we can identify TPC's active in only a single country and global players -like SGS -that certify produce for EurepGAP in over 35 countries. It is assumed that large-scale TPC's have a competitive advantage over smaller "national" certifiers due to differences in certification costs and reputation assets. In addition, multinational companies that are diversified across many markets will be less affected by increased competitive pressure in a single market. We hypothesize a negative impact of Activity on the level of competition.
Share_Veggie and Share_Fruit describe TPC j's share in country i's market for certified fruits and vegetables, respectively. With increasing market shares individual certifiers are assumed to face lower competitive and cost pressure, as the underlying market structure deviates toward more oligopolistic structures and finally a monopoly where a single TPC accounts for all certified product.
Exp_Agri and Exp_Food are proxies for the export orientation of country i with respect to the value of its overall exports of agricultural and processed foods, relative to the total size of its fruit and vegetable sector.
We assume that an increasing share in international fruit and vegetable market positively affects country i's involvement in the EurepGAP standard. Hence, we hypothesize positive signs for these variables.
and quality assurance for food stuffs. The variable SGS equals one for countries in which this TPC conducts EurepGAP standard certification and is zero for all other countries. The presence of SGS in country i is assumed to hinder market entry of smaller TPCs and therefore results in less competition in these markets. We expect a negative coefficient.
Americas and Europe are dummy variables depicting the geographical regions South America and Europe. The data identifies South America and
Europe -the origin of EurepGAP -as areas of major certification activity.
We hypothesize that these regions show higher levels of competition among EurepGAP certification contracts. 
Empirical Results
Our results show a relative competitive advantage of larger and more Previous research has addressed the importance of TPCs as a private institution that facilitates the reduction of uncertainties related to information asymmetries in credence food quality and safety attributes. One of the main arguments raised in the literature is that to properly fulfil their role, TPCs must remain independent and stringent [Tanner, 2000; Deaton, 2004; Busch et al., 2005] . This paper maintains that the accuracy of private TPCs might be affected by the level of competition among rival certification providers. Namely that, with increasing numbers of competitors in a market, the level of quality and safety assurance provided under a certain standard might be much reduced.
Based on panel data of EurepGAP's global standard for the certification of fruits and vegetables, our analysis provides empirical evidence and valuable insight into the competitive structures among the rapidly increasing number of EurepGAP accredited certifiers. Moreover, our results are intended to stimulate the ongoing discussion on the role of private thirdparty certification of agricultural and processed food products as an important means to assure the quality and safety of consumer foods.
Private Third-party Certification in Food Supply 22 of 25 Finally, this study emphasises the need for more detailed data to facilitate research on the differences between certified product and residual commodity market segments. Such information is vital to the better understanding of the implications of private food standards, such as EurepGAP, the British Retail Consortium (BRC) or Safe Quality Food (SQF), have on the performance of today' international food supply chains.
